After Defeat: How Governing Parties Respond to Electoral Loss

Supporting Information

Yotam Margalit* — Tel Aviv University
Tara Slough† — New York University
Michael M. Ting‡ — Columbia University

June 12, 2021

Contents

*ymargalit@tau.ac.il
†tara.slough@nyu.edu
‡mmt2033@columbia.edu

A1 Candidate Quality: Measurement and Existing Evidence

A1.1 Measurement of Candidate Quality

In order to understand existing measures of candidate quality, we aimed to locate:

1. Cross-national studies measuring candidate quality;
2. Single country studies measuring candidate quality from countries in our cross-national dataset.

The studies were located through searches of the form:

[country name]	+"candidate quality"	[with or without] "election"
[country name]	+"candidate valence"	[with or without] "election"

The goal here is to provide an overview of measures that have been used in different countries and types of races, not to provide every measure of candidate quality. The list below underrepresents studies of the United States and the UK. In general, cross-national studies are exceedingly rare. Most of the cross-national studies (3/4) are studies of the European Parliament, a single institution.

This exercise provides several suggestions for the design of future research on candidate quality and elections:

1. Most studies find support for hypotheses that (A) candidate quality influences voter support for candidates. Futher, there is some evidence for hypotheses that (B) incumbent quality influences the pool of challengers that decide to contest office.
2. In single-country studies, the most common measure of candidate quality is past elected experience or incumbency. This is a very reasonable measure of quality for some offices. At the lowest level of local office, there are presumably few candidates with past elected experience, at least among non-incumbents. Further, at the level at which we study, party leader, there would be little variation in this variable; most candidates for party leader have served in politics. Indeed, among the variables listed in Table A1, very few exhibit variation at the highest levels of national politics: variation in education, age, media exposure, and (where relevant) list rank is substantially curtailed.
3. Recent work by Nyhuis (2016, 2018) that measures quality via residual variation or random effects comes closest to our theoretical conception of candidate valence: residual (non-policy) attributes of candidates that voters value. This approach, however, requires confidence in the specification of the empirical model of a voters' decisionmaking. It is also much more difficult to implement cross-nationally given different institutional features that shape voters' decisionmaking.
4. At the level of party leader, it may be possible to measure valence directly from voters' perceptions (e.g., Knight and Schiff, 2010). This requires direct survey data on questions about candidate quality for each candidate. While this approach is difficult to implement across a long panel like the one that we use in this paper or across all the countries in the sample, it may provide a means to measure candidate quality – measured directly from voters' perceptions as opposed to expert determinations – for more recent elections.

Country	Citation	Elected Office	Experience	Other Measure

Belgium	Maddens et al. (2006)	National legislature		**Media exposure**: Articles naming candidate
Canada	Milligan and Rekkas (2008)	National legislature	✓	**Education** of candidates
	Loewen et al. (2013)	National legislature	✓	
	Roy and Alcantara (2015)	Mayor (hypothetical)		**Biography** of hypothetical candidate (survey experiment)
Denmark	Kjaer and Krook (2019)	Municipal		**Gender**
Finland	Kotakorpi and Poutvaara (2011)	National legislature, municipal council		**Education** of candidates
France	Palda and Palda (1998)	National legislature	(✓)	**Incumbency**
Germany	Hainmueller and Kern (2008)	National legislature	✓	(Presence of shadow incumbent)
	Nyhuis (2016)	National legislature		**Residual variation** (error term): from regression of vote share on policy distance, party ID
	Nyhuis (2018)	National legislature		**Candidate random effects**: from multilevel model of vote choice on policy distance and party ID
Hungary	Papp (2017)	National legislature	✓	**Gender**; **age**
Ireland	Benoit and Marsh (2010)	National legislature	✓	
Israel	Sheafer and Tzionit (2006)	National legislature		**Media skills**
Japan	Cox and Thies (2000)	National legislature	(✓)	**Past electoral losses** (inverse of quality)
	Burden (2009)	National legislature	✓	**Incumbency**
	Reed, Scheiner, and Thies (2012)	National legislature	✓	**Celebrity**; **dynasts**
	Ariga (2015)	National legislature	✓	(many additional measures, traits)
Norway	Fiva and Smith (2017)	National legislature		**Local candidate**
Portugal	Cancela, Dias, and Lisi (2017)	National legislature (primary)		**Endorsement Centrality**
Slovakia	Crisp et al. (2013)	National legislature		**List position**
Spain	Esteve-Volart and Bagues (2012)	National legislature		**Gender**
Sweden	Folke, Persson, and Rickne (2016)	Municipal elections		**Future party leader** (prospective)
	Besley et al. (2017)	Municipal, national elections		**Earnings** (residualized)
	Dal Bó et al. (2017)	Municipal, national elections		**IQ**; **Leadership Score**; **Earnings**; **Occupation**
UK	Silvester and Dykes (2010)	National legislature (hypothetical)		**Gender**, **debate performance**, and **critical thinking**
	Mattes and Milazzo (2014)	National legislature		**Attractiveness** from photo

	Campbell et al. (2016)	National legislature		**Dissent rate**
US	Green and Krasno (1988)	National legislature	✓	**Celebrity**; **professional status**; **political activist**
	Jacobson (1989)	National legislature	✓	
	Squire (1992)	National legislature	✓	**Campaign skill**
	McCurley and Mondak (1995)	National legislature		**Biography**: words concering competence or integrity
	Knight and Schiff (2010)	President (primaries)		**Voter opinion**: trustworthy, shared values, knowledgeable, recklessness
	Stone and Simas (2010)	National legislature		**Personal characteristics** (i.e. integrity, competence, qualifications)
	Hirano and Snyder (2019)	National legislature, subnational legislature, governor, local	✓	
Cross-national	Hobolt and Hoyland (2011)	European Parliament	✓	
	Kovar and Kovar (2013)	European Parliament	✓	
	Pemstein, Meserve, and Bernhard (2015)	European Parliament	(✓)	**Incumbency**
	André et al. (2015)	National legislatures (3 countries)		**Past Rank on List**

Table A1: Australia, Austria, Denmark, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Iceland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Slovenia, and Turkey are included in the data but not in this list.

A2 Illustrative Case Studies: Platform Positioning after Loss of Power

Examination of cases of electoral defeat and loss of power reveals substantial variation in parties' repositioning subsequent to losing power. We consider the selection and role of party leaders associated with these platforms.

In some cases, parties remain anchored to their pre-election positions, as was evident in the case of Israel's Labor Party's 1988 electoral defeat. Rather than shift the party's ideological positioning in any significant way, the party kept its platform largely intact. The party's emblem of change was mostly centered on new personnel, when Itzhak Rabin narrowly beat Shimon Peres in Labor's primaries. This change in leadership did not come with a radical shift in the party's official stance, but Rabin - a heralded former Chief of Staff and Security Minister - was perceived as a "tough guy" who was strong on security matters. Indeed, this aura helped Labor win back power in the 1992 elections.

In other cases, parties appear to adopt substantially more *extreme* positions after losing office. In 1976, the United States Republican party lost the presidency after incumbent Gerald Ford was defeated. Ford, who overcame a primary challenge by former California Governor Ronald Reagan, ran as a moderate candidate with executive experience. His loss in the Presidential elections set up an intense primary competition between factions of the Republican party in the run-up to the 1980 elections. Against the more centrist candidate, former CIA Director and UN Ambassador George H.W. Bush, Reagan ran on a distinctly conservative agenda that advocated supply-side economic policies, a promise to balance the budget (for the first time since 1969), and a muscular foreign policy that included a substantial increase in defense spending. Although Bush won several early primaries, including Pennsylvania and Michigan, Reagan was able to overcome his challenger and claim the party's nomination. This victory sparked a dramatic rightward shift away from the center.

Finally, some parties move to the center after loss of power. After holding power for 13 years, the Australian Labour party was defeated by the Liberal-National party in 1996. Immediately after the election, Labour party leader Paul Keating stepped aside and in his place, Kim Beazley was elected by the parliamentary coalition. In the ensuing election colored by economic concerns over the Goods and Service Tax introduced by the new government, the Labour platform moved further right, toward the (shifting) center of the political spectrum.

This brief discussion lays out a clear variation in governing parties' post-defeat strategies. Yet it also highlights a number of central unanswered questions. First, how does the ideological positioning of just-defeated parties differ from the positioning of other parties? In other words, to what extent does loss of power change the subsequent strategies adopted by parties? Second, how common are each of these trajectories in the aggregate? Our study seeks to offer answers to these questions based on a systematic analysis of party positioning in post-war OECD democracies.

A3 RHS Variables: Operationalization and Measurement

A3.1 Operationalization

All right hand side variables, including the treatment, moderators, and covariates are listed in Table A2. This table excludes fixed effects. In some specifications, moderators serve as covariates.

Variable Name	Source	Construction
A: Main Treatment Indicator		
Loss of Power$_{it}$	Hand coded, cross-checked with Williams and Seki (2016)	Non-caretaker government party prior to t is no longer a coalition member after election t
B: Moderators		
To Extreme$_{t-1}$	MARPOR	Following Equation 2, lagged by one election. Represents shift from platform $t-1$ to t.
Absolute Shift$_{t-1}$	MARPOR	Following Equation 1, lagged by one election. Represents shift from platform $t-1$ to t.
Large Selectorate$_{it}$	Kenig, Rahat, and Hazan (2013) supplemented by additional hand-coding	Binary: 1 indicates party convention or more inclusive (open, closed primaries); 0 indicates more restrictive than party convention (most commonly delegates to a convention, parliamentary caucus)
C: Covariates		
Voteshare$_{it}$	MARPOR	National vote share for party i in election t. Presidential vote share in the US.
Δ *Voteshare*$_{it}$	MARPOR	National vote share$_t$-National vote share$_{t-1}$
Out of Coalition$_{it}$	Hand coded, cross-checked with Williams and Seki (2016)	Coalition member prior to t is no longer a coalition member after election t

Table A2: Construction of main variables used in estimation. This table excludes fixed effects used in estimation.

A3.2 Descriptive Statistics

	Observations	Mean	Minimum	Quartile 1	Median	Quartile 3	Maximum
Loss of Power	1891	0.09	0	0	0	0	1
To Extreme$_{t-1}$	1886	-0.33	-124.02	-10.10	-0	9.05	102.10
Absolute Shift$_{t-1}$	1886	13.11	0	3.59	9.51	18.60	124.02
Large Selectorate$_{it}$	1282	0.72	0	0	1	1	1
Low Growth$_t$	1424	0.11	0	0	0	0	1
Voteshare$_{it}$	1891	18.54	0	6.15	13.18	30.38	67.88
Δ Voteshre$_{it}$	1891	-0.10	-35.83	-2.14	-0.08	1.95	29.62
Out of Coalition$_{it}$	1891	0.12	0	0	0	0	1

Table A3: Descriptive statistics for each of the main RHS covariates used in regression specifications.



Figure A1: Linear correlation between our time-variant selectorate measure and the time-invariant Schumacher, De Vries, and Vis (2013) party-orginazation measure on the parties in the Schumacher, De Vries, and Vis (2013) sample.

A4 Selectorate Data and Existing Measures of Party Organization

Schumacher, De Vries, and Vis (2013) posit activist parties as having more veto points for activists in party decision-making, writing: "Whereas the [leadership-dominated parties] are characterized by an absence of internal veto players and thus a party leadership that controls the policy agenda, decision- making power in activist-dominated parties is divided across a large set of internal veto players such as local and regional party branches" (474). Our measure of the selectorate size for party leadership represents an operationalization of one such institutional veto point.

Schumacher, De Vries, and Vis (2013) use an expert-coded measure of party organization from Laver and Hunt (1992). The measure they use is cross-sectional and they study 55 parties in 8 European countries. Their sample is constrained by lack of overlap between measures of party organization and available public opinion data (p. 468). The Laver and Hunt (1992) measure is an expert coding of:

1. The power of the party leadership over policy choices (0 to 20 scale)
2. The power of party activists over policy choices (0 to 20 scale)

The measure is then: party score (#1) - party score (#2) + lowest party value (see Schumacher, De Vries, and Vis p. 469). In this setting higher values reflect more power of party leadership vis a vis activists. In principle, a larger selectorate is consistent with less power of party leadership vis a vis activists. As such, we would expect a negative correlation with the Schumacher, De Vries, and Vis (2013)/Laver and Hunt (1992) variable.

Our data on party selectorates is coded from 1960-2015 across 28 countries. It is time-varying: some parties change their leadership selection processes over the course of the sample. We assess the correlation between our large selectorate variable and the Schumacher, De Vries, and Vis (2013)/Laver and Hunt (1992) party organization variable on Schumaker et al.'s sample of 55 parties in Figure A1. Two points are of note, first, the correlation is negative, but weak. Importantly, the strength of the correlation varies over time as parties change their leadership selection institutions. We suggest that the correlation may be strengthened through further work identifying a wider set of intraparty activist veto points.

A5 Platform Classification

A5.1 Alternate Definitions of Platform Classification

We redefine the definition of the categorical classification of a center platform in two ways:

1. Define mean and standard deviation with respect to a three election moving average including elections $t-2$, $t-1$, and t. Note that to construct the moving average, we loose the first two elections from each country, resulting in a slightly lower sample size.

2. Define the mean and standard deviation as in the paper but constrain a "right" party from being classified as having a "left" platform and vice versa.

We present stability plots under both alternative platform definitions in Figures A6 and A7.

A5.2 Robustness: Alternate Bandwidths

In the main text, we define platforms according to the following formula:

$$\text{Platform classification}_t^{ic} = \begin{cases} \text{Left} & \text{if } P_t^{ic} < \mu_{P^c} - \frac{1}{2}\sigma_{P^c} \\ \text{Center} & \text{if } P_t^{ic} \in [\mu_{P^c} - \frac{1}{2}\sigma_{P^c}, \mu_{P^c} + \frac{1}{2}\sigma_{P^c}] \\ \text{Right} & \text{if } P_t^{ic} > \mu_{P^c} + \frac{1}{2}\sigma_{P^c} \end{cases} \tag{1}$$

Here, we assess the robustness of the main finding to alternate bandwidths than $\frac{1}{2}$ country standard deviation. Specifically, we examine bandwidths from $\frac{1}{20}$ to 1 to assess the robustness of the negative association between loss of power and subsequent adoption of a center platform. Note that as the bandwidth increases, the share of "center" platforms also increases. The size of this "center" category is necessary for the interpretation of the point estimates on "Loss of Power." Note that regardless of of the bandwidth or operationalization of the dependent variable in Figure A2, all point estimates are negative.



Figure A2: This graph plots the estimates from the specification in Column (5) of Tables 1 (main text) and the analogous specifications reported in Figures A6, and A7 with alternate bandwidths for the definition of a "center" platform. Confidence intervals are constructed from standard errors clustered by party. Thick lines correspond to 90% confidence intervals and thin lines correspond to 95% confidence intervals.

A5.3 Markov Analysis of Platform Shifts

Using each of the three definitions above, we code the distribution of platforms in time t to time $t+1$, subsequent to loss and victory. For this analysis we condition the sample on the 383 governing parties in the sample (the sample in the placebo graph).

1. **Baseline Platform Classification, Main Text**
2. **Moving Average-Based Platform Classification, Figure A6**
3. **Restricted Platform Classification, Figure A7**

After Re-Election

	Left	Center	Right
Left	0.65	0.29	0.06
Center	0.15	0.58	0.27
Right	0.05	0.46	0.49

After Loss

	Left	Center	Right
Left	0.77	0.21	0.03
Center	0.21	0.50	0.29
Right	0.13	0.23	0.64

Table A4: Estimated transition matrices subsequent to re-election and loss. Includes only parties that were in power going into the election in time t.

After Re-Election

	Left	Center	Right
Left	0.57	0.31	0.12
Center	0.19	0.49	0.31
Right	0.07	0.38	0.55

After Loss

	Left	Center	Right
Left	0.61	0.34	0.05
Center	0.36	0.36	0.29
Right	0.12	0.19	0.68

Table A5: Estimated transition matrices subsequent to re-election and loss. Includes only parties that were in power going into the election in time t for whom the moving average is defined ($n = 353$).

A5.4 Illustrative Examples: Coding of US and UK Platforms

With respect to the coding of platforms we provide case evidence from platforms over the time series in the US and the UK. Tables A7 and A8 indicate the classification of platforms in the main coding. Here consider the elections in which the party was in power preceding the election. The cases with brackets in black are constrained to a center platform (rather than the platform opposite ideology) in the restricted classification. Their classification under the restricted measure appears in red.

UK

		To Extreme				To Center		No Change		
Party	Result	$C \to L$	$C \to R$	$R \to L$	$L \to R$	$L \to C$	$R \to C$	$L \to L$	$C \to C$	$R \to R$
Conservative	V					[1959]		1955	[1959]	1983
										1987
										1992
	L		1964							1997
			1974a							
Liberal	V						[2001]	1950	1966	
								1974b	[2001]	
									2005	
	L	1970						1951		
		2010						1979		

Table A7: UK elections and movement of (former) governing parties subsequent to loss. A result of **V**ictory corresponds to re-election wheras a result of **L**oss indicates a loss of power. The elections "1974a" and "1974b" correspond to the elections of February and October 1974, respectively. Entries in brackets indicate discrepancy between the main (black) and restricted (red) platform classification measures.

US

After Re-Election	Left	Center	Right
Left	0.68	0.32	0.00
Center	0.11	0.74	0.14
Right	0.00	0.40	0.60

After Loss	Left	Center	Right
Left	0.83	0.17	0.00
Center	0.21	0.59	0.20
Right	0	0.28	0.72

Table A6: Estimated transition matrices subsequent to re-election and loss. Includes only parties that were in power going into the election in time t.

		To Extreme				To Center		No Change		
Party	Result	$C \to L$	$C \to R$	$R \to L$	$L \to R$	$L \to C$	$R \to C$	$L \to L$	$C \to C$	$R \to R$
Democrat	V							1964	1996	
	L							1952	2000	
								1968		
								1980		
Republican	V		1956						1972	1984
										1988
										2004
	L		[1960]	[1960]					1992	
	L		1976							1992
										2008

Table A8: US elections and movement of (former) governing parties subsequent to loss. A result of **V**ictory corresponds to re-election wheras a result of **L**oss indicates a loss of power. Entries in brackets indicate discrepancy between the main (black) and restricted (red) platform classification measures.

A6 Two versus Multiparty Systems

Theoretical results about platform positioning are, as in our model, better established in two- than in multiparty systems. In Tables A9-A12, we replicate our results from the main paper while disaggregating between two- and multiparty systems. We do not detect statistically significant differences between responses to loss in two- versus multiparty systems.

	Center Platform$_{t+1}$		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Loss of Power$_t$	-0.137^{***}	-0.123^{**}	-0.142^{***}
	(0.035)	(0.052)	(0.049)
Two party = multiparty, p-value		0.98	
Sample	All	$\approx$ 2 party	$>$ 2 party
Voteshare$_t$	yes	yes	yes
Platform$_t$ FE	yes	yes	yes
Party FE	yes	yes	yes
Election FE	yes	yes	yes
Observations	1,888	814	1,074
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

Table A9: The association between loss of power and adoption of a center platform in election $t+1$, disaggregated by two- and multi-party systems. Results for the full sample are in Column [1] and results for each sub-samples are in Colums [2] and [3]. Standard errors are clustered at the party level.

	Center Platform$_{t+1}$		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Loss of Power$_t$	0.414	-2.670	3.321
	(1.923)	(3.221)	(2.352)
To Extreme$_{t-1}$	-0.399^{***}	-0.337^{***}	-0.460^{***}
	(0.028)	(0.047)	(0.029)
Loss of power$_t\times$ To Extreme$_{t-1}$	-0.194^{**}	-0.351^{*}	-0.115
	(0.087)	(0.179)	(0.078)
Voteshare$_t$	yes	yes	yes
Platform$_t$ FE	yes	yes	yes
Party FE	yes	yes	yes
Election FE	yes	yes	yes
Observations	1,885	812	1,073
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

Table A10: The association between loss of power and platform shifts toward the extreme, conditional on the previous platform shift. Results for the full sample are in Column [1] and results for each sub-samples are in Colums [2] and [3]. Standard errors are clustered at the party level.

	Shift Magnitude_$t+1$		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Loss of Power$_t$	-1.231	-5.762	11.996*
	(3.379)	(4.104)	(6.736)
Large Selectorate$_t$	-4.857	-8.577	-0.258
	(4.864)	(7.895)	(2.904)
Loss of power$_t \times$ Large Selectorate$_t$	0.766	0.837	-6.180
	(4.054)	(4.811)	(7.148)
Two party = multiparty, p-value		0.335	
	Shift Magnitude$_{t+1}$		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Loss of Power$_t$	8.249***	9.943***	-1.307
	(2.466)	(2.754)	(3.086)
Large Selectorate$_t$	2.228	-0.057	5.198***
	(3.145)	(5.496)	(1.579)
Loss of power$_t \times$ Large Selectorate$_t$	-5.768^{**}	-5.299	0.373
	(2.878)	(3.585)	(3.082)
Two party = multiparty, p-value		0.824	
Sample	All	$\approx$ 2 party	>2 party
Voteshare$_t$	yes	yes	yes
Out of Coalition$_t$	yes	yes	yes
Party FE	yes	yes	yes
Election FE	yes	yes	yes
Observations	1,115	551	564
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A11: The association between loss of power and platform shifts, moderate by selectorate size. Results for the full sample are in Column [1] and results for each sub-samples are in Colums [2] and [3]. Standard errors are clustered at the party level.

	Government Party$_{t+2}$					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Loss of Power$_t$	-0.215^{***}	-0.352^{***}	-0.062	-0.267^{***}	-0.453^{***}	-0.069
	(0.062)	(0.092)	(0.061)	(0.071)	(0.097)	(0.086)
To Extreme$_{t+1}$	-0.085^{*}	-0.167^{**}	-0.026			
	(0.051)	(0.083)	(0.058)			
Absolute Shift$_{t+1}$				-0.069	-0.108	-0.010
				(0.094)	(0.115)	(0.149)
Loss of power$_t \times$ To Extreme$_{t+1}$	0.439^{***}	0.369	0.538^{**}			
	(0.168)	(0.239)	(0.224)			
Loss of power$_t \times$ Absolute Shift$_{t+1}$				0.377	0.729^{**}	0.081
				(0.231)	(0.308)	(0.348)
Two party = multiparty, p-value		0.578			0.173	
Sample	All	$\approx$ 2 party	>2 party	All	$\approx$ 2 party	>2 party
Voteshare_t	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Party FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Election FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	1,886	813	1,073	1,886	813	1,073

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A12: The association between loss of power in election t and return to power in election $t+1$, conditional on changes in platform in between the two elections. "To Extreme$_{t+1}$" and "Shift Magnitude$_{t+1}$" are divided by 100 to scale coefficient estimates. The results are disaggregated by two- and multi-party systems. Results for the full sample are in Columns [1] and [4] and results for each sub-samples are in Colums [2]-[3] and [5]-[6]. Standard errors are clustered at the party level.

A7 Governing Party vs. Coalition Loss

In Tables A13-A15, we examine empirically the association between loss of power as the governing party and a loss of power as any other coalition party. We drop the distinction between two- or more party elections because coalition governments are infrequent in the former category. Note two treatment indicators:

- *Loss of Power*$_t$: Governing party (non-coalition or leader of coalition) loses power in election t. This is identical to the treatment indicator in the main text.
- *Coalition Loss of Power*$_t$: A coalition member party (but not the leader of the coalition) loses membership in a coalition government in election t

We estimate all main specifications with both treatment indicators and analogous interactions.

	Center Platform$_{t+1}$				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Loss of Power$_t$	-0.114^{**}	-0.122^{***}	-0.147^{***}	-0.144^{***}	-0.136^{***}
	(0.045)	(0.041)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.037)
Coalition Loss of Power$_t$	0.033	0.074	0.044	0.043	-0.003
	(0.030)	(0.067)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.058)
Voteshare$_t$	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Platform$_t$ FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Party FE			yes	yes	yes
Decade FE				yes	
Election FE		yes			yes
Observations	1,888	1,888	1,888	1,888	1,888
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

Table A13: The association between loss of power and adoption of a center platform in election $t+1$. The covariates and fixed effects included in each model are indicated in the middle panel. All standard errors are clustered at the party level.

	To Extreme$_{t+1}$					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Loss of Power$_t$	1.476	1.551	0.763	1.874	1.804	0.843
	(2.053)	(1.976)	(1.979)	(2.191)	(2.179)	(1.912)
Coalition Loss of Power$_t$, To Extreme$_{t-1}$	−0.979	−0.996	−2.826	−0.552	−0.712	−1.913
	(1.007)	(1.016)	(2.340)	(1.124)	(1.079)	(2.387)
To Extreme$_{t-1}$	−0.402***	−0.377***	−0.370***	−0.401***	−0.402***	−0.394***
	(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.032)
Loss of power$_t\times$ To Extreme$_{t-1}$		−0.188**	−0.164	−0.217***	−0.196**	−0.169
		(0.086)	(0.108)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.106)
Coal loss of power$_t\times$ To Extreme$_{t-1}$		−0.014	−0.010	−0.004	−0.021	−0.027
		(0.067)	(0.090)	(0.070)	(0.068)	(0.084)
Voteshare_t	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Party FE				yes	yes	yes
Decade FE					yes	
Election FE			yes			yes
Observations	1,885	1,885	1,885	1,885	1,885	1,885
Note:						*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A14: The conditional association between loss of power and movement to extreme between elections t and $t+1$, conditioned on the previous platform shift between elections $t-1$ and t. The covariates and fixed effects included in each model are indicated in the middle panel. All standard errors are clustered at the party level.

	To Extreme$_{t+1}$				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Loss of Power$_t$	-0.665	-1.033	-1.234	-0.913	-1.015
	(4.037)	(3.859)	(4.899)	(4.879)	(4.014)
Large Selectorate	0.076	2.081	-1.989	-1.613	-5.176
	(1.097)	(1.853)	(4.088)	(4.017)	(5.183)
Coal. loss of power$_t$	1.204	2.554	1.593	1.398	0.313
	(2.034)	(4.768)	(2.571)	(2.539)	(4.838)
Loss of power$_t \times$ Large Selectorate	0.503	0.325	0.622	0.299	0.118
	(4.675)	(4.501)	(5.487)	(5.478)	(4.513)
Coal. loss of power$_t \times$ Large Selectorate	-0.939	-2.043	-0.547	-0.764	1.315
	(2.581)	(4.488)	(3.101)	(3.037)	(4.393)
	Shift Magnitude$_{t+1}$				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Loss of Power$_t$	7.106**	9.465***	6.442**	6.435**	8.800***
	(3.107)	(3.217)	(2.875)	(2.835)	(2.455)
Large Selectorate	0.102	1.502	-1.096	-1.137	2.482
	(0.970)	(1.236)	(2.100)	(2.317)	(3.162)
Coal. loss of power$_t$	-2.218	-4.881^{**}	-1.802	-2.070	-3.162
	(1.756)	(2.280)	(1.748)	(1.785)	(2.146)
Loss of power$_t \times$ Large Selectorate	-3.313	-6.967^{*}	-2.983	-2.977	-5.490^{*}
	(3.578)	(3.610)	(3.361)	(3.321)	(2.995)
Coal. loss of power$_t \times$ Large Selectorate	1.676	2.004	1.669	1.840	-0.536
	(2.010)	(2.093)	(2.124)	(2.182)	(1.715)
Voteshare_t	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Out of Coalition_t	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Party FE			yes	yes	yes
Decade FE				yes	
Election FE		yes			yes
Observations	1,115	1,115	1,115	1,115	1,115
Note:					*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A15: The conditional association between loss of power and platform shifts, as moderated by selectorate size. All standard errors are clustered at the party level.

A8 Voter Ideology Covariates

In our robustness tests in the stability plots below, we follow Ezrow et al. (2011) in adjusting for pre-treatment electorate ideology covariates. We use replication from Ezrow et al. (2011) for the EuroBarometer surveys that ask for party self-identification in terms of "closeness" to a party as well as placement on a left-right scale ranging from 0 to 10. The EuroBarometer covers a subset of countries from 1983 to 2006. We increase the number of countries covered using similar questions from both the European Social Survey (2002-2016) and the World Values Survey (1989-2012). Despite augmenting the dataset with the additional surveys, our data covers only the end of the panel and we have very uneven coverage across countries. Figure A3 depicts the coverage of the ideologial self-placement data across survey sources.



Figure A3: Country years for which partisan ideological self-placement is measured.

In order to avoid the possibility of post-treatment bias, we include a measure of mean party member ideology preceding the election at time t, where the "Loss of Power" treatment is coded, by one or two years, depending on data availability. If partisan ideology is available for party p in year $t-1$, we use that measure; otherwise we use the measure from $t-2$; if we do not have a measure within the two years before an election, we impute a "0" and include a dummy variable for missingness.

Note that because these variables are measured at the country-election level, they are subsumed in election fixed effects, where employed.

A9 Robustness to Alternate Covariate Adjustment and Weighting Specifications

In this section, we examine the robustness of the results of our main tables in the form of coefficient stability plots. These figures depict the results of our specifications with all permutations of covariates and fixed effects. We also consider the robustness of our results to different weighting schemes (i.e., not reweighting countries equally) and different operationalizations of the dependent (and lagged dependent) variables. In these plots, we report coefficients representing our main results of interest. Table

		Changes to:			
Table	Plot	Weighting	Outcome	Notes	Coefficient estimates plotted
1	A4	–	–	Identical to Table 1 except with all covariate permutations and including mean voter ideology covariates.	Loss of Power$_t$
1	A5	✓	–	No reweighting of observations by country.	Loss of Power$_t$
1	A6	–	✓	Redefinition #1 of platform classifications. Defines left, right, and center platforms according to country-level moving average (3 elections) with threshold at $\mu_t \pm \frac{1}{2}\sigma$.	Loss of Power$_t$
1	A7	–	✓	Redefinition #2 of platform classifications. Restricts left parties from being classified as having a "right" platform and vice versa.	Loss of Power$_t$
2	A8	–	–	Identical to Table 2 except with all covariate permutations.	Loss of Power$_t \times$ To Extreme$_{t-1}$
2	A9	✓	–	No reweighting of observations by country.	Loss of Power$_t \times$ To Extreme$_{t-1}$
2	A10	–	✓	Uses logit-transformed ideology measure proposed by Lowe et al. (2011) to measure platform ideologies. Note that the range of this variable is different than the Manifesto Project RILE scale so coefficients are rescaled.	Loss of Power$_t \times$ To Extreme$_{t-1}$
2	A11	–	✓	Uses the difference between a party's shift to the extreme and the median party shift in election t as the dependent variable.	Loss of Power$_t \times$ To Extreme$_{t-1}$
3	A12	–	–	Identical to Table 3, Panel B except with all covariate permutations and including mean voter ideology covariates.	Loss of Power$_t$, Loss of Power$_t \times$Large Selectorate
3	A13	✓	–	No reweighting of observations by country.	Loss of Power$_t$, Loss of Power$_t \times$Large Selectorate
3	A14	–	✓	Uses logit-transformed ideology measure proposed by Lowe et al. (2011) to measure platform ideologies. Note that the range of this variable is different than the Manifesto Project RILE scale so coefficients are rescaled.	Loss of Power$_t$, Loss of Power$_t \times$Large Selectorate
3	A15	–	✓	Uses the difference between a party's shift magnitude and the median party shift in election t as the dependent variable.	Loss of Power$_t$, Loss of Power$_t \times$Large Selectorate
4	A16	–	–	Identical to Table 4 except with all covariate permutations and including mean voter ideology.	Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ To Extreme$_{t+1}$
4	A17	✓	–	No reweighting of observations by country	Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ To Extreme$_{t+1}$
4	A18	–	✓	Uses logit-transformed ideology measure proposed by Lowe et al. (2011) to measure To Extreme$_{t+1}$. Note that the range of this variable is different than the Manifesto Project RILE scale so coefficients are rescaled.	Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ To Extreme$_{t+1}$

Table A16: List of stability plot specifications, results

A9.1 Robustness of Table 1: Probability of Center Platform

In Figures A4-A7 we examine the robustness of the estimates in Table 1 to: (a) all covariate permutations; (b) no reweighting by country; and (c) different operationalizations of our platform classification outcome. In general, we find robust evidence that a loss of power is associated with a reduction in the share of centrist platforms.



Figure A4: Stability plot corresponding to the coefficient estimates on “Loss of Power$_t$” in Table 1. This plot includes all permutations of covariate specifications. 95% confidence intervals calculated from standard errors clustered by party. Note that the navy points indicate $p > 0.1$, the blue points indicate $p \in [0.05, 0.1)$, the green points indicate $p \in [0.01, 0.05)$, and the pink points indicate $p < 0.01$.

A9.2 Robustness of Table 2: Loss of Power and Magnitude of Reversal

In Figures A8-A11, we examine the robustness of the estimates in Table 2 to: (a) all covariate permutations; (b) no reweighting by country; and (c) different operationalizations of our platform classification outcome. We find robust evidence across all specifications that a loss of power is associated with a larger platform course correction. We depict the coefficients on the interaction of “Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ To Extreme$_t$.”

A9.3 Robustness of Table 3, Panel B: Loss of Power, Selectorate Size, and Shift Magnitude

In Figures A12-A15, we examine the robustness of the estimates in Table 3 to: (a) all covariate permutations; (b) no reweighting by country; and (c) different operationalizations of our platform classification outcome. These results are the most variable across all of our main findings. However, we find general increases in the magnitude of platform shifts among losing parties across specifications. The significance of the interaction between a loss of power and the large selectorate indicator varies as a function of the inclusion of election fixed effects.

A9.4 Robustness of Table 4: Loss of Power, Shift, and Return to Power

Figures A16-A18 demonstrate the robustness of the finding of that among parties that lose power in election t, shifts to the extreme in $t + 1$ are associated with a higher probability of return to power in $t + 2$.



Figure A5: Stability plot corresponding to the coefficient estimates on "Loss of Power$_t$" in Table 1. This plot includes all permutations of covariate specifications and weights observations equally (e.g., the data is not reweighted by country). 95% confidence intervals calculated from standard errors clustered by party. Note that the navy points indicate $p > 0.1$, the blue points indicate $p \in [0.05, 0.1)$, the green points indicate $p \in [0.01, 0.05)$, and the pink points indicate $p < 0.01$.



Figure A6: Stability plot corresponding to the coefficient estimates on "Loss of Power$_t$" in Table 1. This plot includes all permutations of covariate specifications and defines left, center, and right platforms based on a country-level moving average. 95% confidence intervals calculated from standard errors clustered by party. Note that the navy points indicate $p > 0.1$, the blue points indicate $p \in [0.05, 0.1)$, the green points indicate $p \in [0.01, 0.05)$, and the pink points indicate $p < 0.01$.



Figure A7: Stability plot corresponding to the coefficient estimates on "Loss of Power$_t$" in Table 1. This plot includes all permutations of covariate specifications and restricts classification of left, center, and right platforms based on ideology of party family (i.e. left or right). 95% confidence intervals calculated from standard errors clustered by party. Note that the blue points indicate $p \in [0.05, 0.1)$, the green points indicate $p \in [0.01, 0.05)$, and the pink points indicate $p < 0.01$.



Figure A8: Stability plot corresponding to the coefficient estimates on "Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ To Extreme$_t$" in Table 2. This plot includes all permutations of covariate specifications. 95% confidence intervals calculated from standard errors clustered by party. Note that the navy points indicate $p > 0.1$, the blue points indicate $p \in [0.05, 0.1)$, the green points indicate $p \in [0.01, 0.05)$, and the pink points indicate $p < 0.01$.



Figure A9: Stability plot corresponding to the coefficient estimates on "Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ To Extreme$_t$" in Table 2. This plot includes all permutations of covariate specifications and weights observations equally (e.g., the data is not reweighted by country). 95% confidence intervals calculated from standard errors clustered by party. Note that the green points indicate $p \in [0.01, 0.05)$, and the pink points indicate $p < 0.01$.



Figure A10: Stability plot corresponding to the coefficient estimates on "Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ To Extreme$_t$" in Table 2. This plot includes all permutations of covariate specifications and uses the logit-transformed ideology measure proposed by Lowe et al. (2011). 95% confidence intervals calculated from standard errors clustered by party. Note that the pink points indicate $p < 0.01$.



Figure A11: Stability plot corresponding to the coefficient estimates on "Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ To Extreme$_t$" in Table 2. The dependent variable here is the difference between a party's shift and the median party shift in election t. 95% confidence intervals calculated from standard errors clustered by party. Note that the pink points indicate $p < 0.01$.



Figure A12: Stability plot corresponding to the coefficient estimates on "Loss of Power$_t$" (top panel) "Loss of Power$_t \times$ Large Selectorate" (bottom panel) in Table 3, Panel B. This plot includes all permutations of covariate specifications. 95% confidence intervals calculated from standard errors clustered by party. 95% confidence intervals calculated from standard errors clustered by party. Note that the navy points indicate $p > 0.1$, the blue points indicate $p \in [0.05, 0.1)$, the green points indicate $p \in [0.01, 0.05)$, and the pink points indicate $p < 0.01$.



Figure A13: Stability plot corresponding to the coefficient estimates on "Loss of Power$_t$" (top panel) "Loss of Power$_t \times$ Large Selectorate" (bottom panel) in Table 3, Panel B, without reweighting by country. This plot includes all permutations of covariate specifications. 95% confidence intervals calculated from standard errors clustered by party. 95% confidence intervals calculated from standard errors clustered by party. Note that the navy points indicate $p > 0.1$, the blue points indicate $p \in [0.05, 0.1)$, the green points indicate $p \in [0.01, 0.05)$, and the pink points indicate $p < 0.01$.



Figure A14: Stability plot corresponding to the coefficient estimates on "Loss of Power$_t$" (top panel) "Loss of Power$_t \times$ Large Selectorate" (bottom panel) in Table 3, Panel B. The dependent variable is a logit-transformed measure of "Absolute Shift$_t$". This plot includes all permutations of covariate specifications. 95% confidence intervals calculated from standard errors clustered by party. 95% confidence intervals calculated from standard errors clustered by party. Note that the navy points indicate $p > 0.1$, the blue points indicate $p \in [0.05, 0.1)$, the green points indicate $p \in [0.01, 0.05)$, and the pink points indicate $p < 0.01$.



Figure A15: Stability plot corresponding to the coefficient estimates on "Loss of Power$_t$" (top panel) "Loss of Power$_t \times$ Large Selectorate" (bottom panel) in Table 3, Panel B. The dependent variable here is the difference between a party's shift and the median party shift in election t. This plot includes all permutations of covariate specifications. 95% confidence intervals calculated from standard errors clustered by party. 95% confidence intervals calculated from standard errors clustered by party. Note that the navy points indicate $p > 0.1$, the blue points indicate $p \in [0.05, 0.1)$, the green points indicate $p \in [0.01, 0.05)$, and the pink points indicate $p < 0.01$.



Figure A16: Stability plot corresponding to the coefficient estimates on "Loss of Power$_t\times$ To Extreme$_{t+1}$" in Table 4. This plot includes all permutations of covariate specifications. 95% confidence intervals calculated from standard errors clustered by party. Note that the green points indicate $p \in [0.01, 0.05)$, and the pink points indicate $p < 0.01$.



Figure A17: Stability plot corresponding to the coefficient estimates on "Loss of Power$_t\times$ To Extreme$_{t+1}$" in Table 4, without reweighting the data by country. This plot includes all permutations of covariate specifications. 95% confidence intervals calculated from standard errors clustered by party. Note that the green points indicate $p \in [0.01, 0.05)$, and the pink points indicate $p < 0.01$.



Figure A18: Stability plot corresponding to the coefficient estimates on "Loss of Power$_t \times$ To Extreme$_{t+1}$" in Table 4, using the logit-transformed measure of ideology for To Extreme$_{t+1}$. This plot includes all permutations of covariate specifications. 95% confidence intervals calculated from standard errors clustered by party. Note that the green points indicate $p \in [0.01, 0.05)$, and the pink points indicate $p < 0.01$.

A10 Alternate Routes to Loss of Power

Our argument is premised upon the relationship of loss of power to electoral defeat. However, the mapping of electoral fortunes to loss of power varies across cases in our study. In 148/184 of cases of loss of power, the party did indeed lose vote share from elections $t-1$ to t. In this section, we account for this variation. To conduct this analysis systematically, we examine how our main findings vary in Δ *Voteshare*$_{it}$, the difference in vote share of party i from election $t-1$ to t. Where Δ *Voteshare*$_{it} < 0$, a party loses votes between $t-1$ and t.

In this section we ask whether there exists heterogeneity in our findings with respect to Δ *Voteshare*$_{it}$. We do this by replicating the main specifications in Tables 1-4 with interactions with two forms of Δ *Voteshare*$_{it}$:

- Δ *Voteshare*$_{it}$: This enters the continuous covariate Δ *Voteshare*$_{it}$ as an interaction with treatment and any moderators described in the main text.
- *Loss of voteshare*$_{it}$: Here we interact the binary variable constructed from $I[\Delta$ *Voteshare*$_{it} \geq 0]$ with the treatment and any moderators described in the main text. This estimator distinguishes between cases where a party lost power and voteshare (148/181 instances) from those where a party lost power while gaining voteshare (36/181 instances).

Note that the triple interactions in this section are (statistically) underpowered. Our aim is mainly to assess the sign and magnitude of the main effects in settings where erosion of vote share coincides with loss of power.

Table A10 replicates Table 1 from the main text while examining heterogeneity in Δ *Voteshare*$_{it}$. We observe that in both Panels A and B, loss of power is strongly associated with a reduction in the adoption of centrist platforms in election $t+1$. This relationship does not appear to be moderated by Δ *Voteshare*$_{it}$ (Panel A) and the relationship is quite similar among only cases in which loss of power and loss of voteshare coincide (first row of Panel B).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
				Center Platform$_{t+1}$			
Panel A: Interaction with (Continuous) Δ Vote Share$_t$							
Loss of Power$_t$	-0.113*	-0.176**	-0.152*	-0.154**	-0.185**	-0.104	-0.209*
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.077)	(0.075)
Δ Voteshare$_t$	-0.001	-0.006^{+}	-0.001	-0.002	-0.007	-0.006	-0.007
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ Δ Voteshare$_t$	0.000	0.001	-0.004	-0.003	0.000	0.010	-0.009
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Panel B: Interaction with Binary Indicator for Loss of Vote Share$_t$							
Loss of Power$_t$	-0.117*	-0.166*	-0.092^{+}	-0.093^{+}	-0.133*	-0.164*	-0.091
	(0.050)	(0.061)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.060)	(0.074)	(0.100)
Loss of Voteshare$_t$	-0.031	-0.044	-0.020	-0.023	-0.012	-0.042	0.010
	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ Loss of Voteshare$_t$	0.009	0.074	-0.210^{+}	-0.202^{+}	-0.072	0.264^{+}	-0.166
	(0.111)	(0.123)	(0.107)	(0.110)	(0.126)	(0.141)	(0.157)
Voteshare$_t$	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Platform$_t$ FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Out of Coalition$_t$	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Election FE		yes			yes	yes	yes
Party FE			yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Decade FE				yes			
Sample						Two-Party	> Two-Party
Observations	1888	1888	1888	1888	1888	814	1074

Standard errors are clustered by party.
$^{+}p < 0.10, ^{*}p < 0.05, ^{**}p < 0.005$

Table A17: Standard errors clustered at the party level. Countries are weighted by inverse of number of observations as in Table 1.

Table A10 replicates Table 2 from the main text while examining heterogeneity in Δ *Voteshare*$_{it}$. We observe that in both Panels A and B, the previous shift is predictive of a shift in the opposite direction in the current period irregardless of loss. Further, loss of power increases the magnitude of this "correction". This relationship does not appear to be moderated by Δ *Voteshare*$_{it}$ (Panel A). Further, the conditional relationship that we document is stronger among parties that lost vote share and power (Panel B). The relationship seems to be attenuated in cases where the parties lose power while gaining votes, though the difference is not statistically significant.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
				To Extreme, $t+1$				
Panel A: Interaction with (Continuous) Δ Vote Share$_t$								
Loss of Power$_t$	-0.893	-0.852	-2.117	0.428	0.622	-0.623	-3.539	2.320
	(2.069)	(2.025)	(2.302)	(2.302)	(2.311)	(2.665)	(5.786)	(3.032)
To Extreme$_t$	-0.407**	-0.391**	-0.381**	-0.416**	-0.418**	-0.411**	-0.342**	-0.475**
	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.063)	(0.036)
Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ To Extreme$_t$		-0.130	-0.107	-0.155^{+}	-0.151^{+}	-0.118	-0.225	-0.078
		(0.084)	(0.094)	(0.086)	(0.084)	(0.116)	(0.283)	(0.113)
Δ Vote share$_t$	-0.023	-0.031	-0.020	-0.038	-0.017	-0.024	-0.159	0.015
	(0.072)	(0.081)	(0.099)	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.146)	(0.218)	(0.185)
Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ Δ Vote share$_t$	-0.316^{+}	-0.307^{+}	-0.501^{+}	-0.240	-0.194	-0.272	0.137	-0.875^{+}
	(0.164)	(0.164)	(0.266)	(0.192)	(0.205)	(0.334)	(0.539)	(0.513)
To Extreme$_t$ $\times$ Δ Vote share$_t$		-0.003	-0.002	-0.006	-0.006	-0.009	0.002	-0.018
		(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.012)
Lose Power$_t$ $\times$ To Extreme$_t$ $\times$ Δ Voteshare$_t$		0.009	0.007	0.017	0.016	0.024	0.014	0.052*
		(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.026)
Panel B: Interaction with Binary Indicator for Loss of Vote Share$_t$								
Loss of Power$_t$	3.250	3.435^{+}	2.621	4.447^{+}	4.267^{+}	3.117	-1.711	8.920*
	(2.006)	(1.961)	(2.314)	(2.314)	(2.321)	(2.643)	(3.584)	(3.742)
To Extreme$_t$	-0.408**	-0.370**	-0.353**	-0.376**	-0.379**	-0.368**	-0.350**	-0.383**
	(0.029)	(0.037)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.052)	(0.074)	(0.074)
Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ To Extreme$_t$		-0.218*	-0.213*	-0.286**	-0.276*	-0.287*	-0.368	-0.295*
		(0.089)	(0.102)	(0.099)	(0.102)	(0.126)	(0.221)	(0.133)
Loss of Vote share (binary)$_t$	1.048	1.039	0.379	1.456	1.562	0.444	0.484	0.044
	(0.819)	(0.821)	(0.942)	(0.968)	(0.982)	(1.142)	(1.756)	(1.469)
Lose Power$_t$ $\times$ Loss of Vote share$_t$	-8.492*	-8.908*	-7.485^{+}	-10.452*	-10.312*	-9.742^{+}	-14.424	-12.699*
	(3.436)	(3.481)	(4.432)	(4.298)	(4.394)	(5.228)	(13.132)	(6.101)
To Extreme$_t$ $\times$ Loss of Vote share$_t$		-0.043	-0.060	-0.085	-0.085	-0.097	0.012	-0.187
		(0.064)	(0.070)	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.085)	(0.129)	(0.113)
Lose Power$_t$ $\times$ To Extreme$_t$ $\times$ Loss of Vote share$_t$		0.155	0.197	0.216	0.202	0.279	-0.087	0.419
		(0.189)	(0.212)	(0.223)	(0.218)	(0.264)	(0.695)	(0.283)
Vote share	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Platform, t FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Out of Coalition, t	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Election FE			yes			yes	yes	yes
Party FE				yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Decade FE					yes			
Sample							Two-Party	> Two-Party
Observations	1885	1885	1885	1885	1885	1885	812	1073

Standard errors are clustered by party.
$^{+}p < 0.10, ^{*}p < 0.05, ^{**}p < 0.005$

Table A18: Standard errors clustered at the party level. Countries are weighted by inverse of number of observations as in Table 2.

Table A10 replicates Table 3 Panel 2 from the main text while examining heterogeneity in Δ *Voteshare*$_{it}$. We observe that in both Panels A and B, that with a small selectorate, parties make larger shifts post-loss. The magnitude of the shift is attenuated where the selectorate is larger, though the statistical significance of these findings varies across models. This relationship does not appear to be moderated by Δ *Voteshare*$_{it}$ or its binned counterpart. Note that with lower n due to the selectorate variable, these specifications are particularly underpowered.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
			Absolute Shift$_{t+1}$			
Panel A: Interaction with (Continuous) Δ Vote Share$_t$						
Loss of Power$_t$	9.223*	6.468	9.334*	9.069*	12.173*	1.950
	(3.914)	(3.965)	(4.170)	(4.241)	(5.087)	(5.045)
Large Selectorate	-1.549	-0.588	-0.153	3.904	1.473	6.379*
	(2.229)	(2.468)	(2.398)	(3.865)	(6.694)	(2.663)
Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ Large Selectorate$_t$	-4.720	-1.973	-7.873	-10.593*	-15.011*	-1.942
	(5.012)	(5.248)	(4.807)	(4.746)	(6.318)	(4.823)
Δ Vote share$_t$	-0.051	-0.094	0.056	0.041	-0.059	0.110
	(0.127)	(0.116)	(0.134)	(0.140)	(0.154)	(0.225)
Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ Δ Vote share$_t$	0.711	0.464	0.288	0.054	0.533	1.877
	(0.470)	(0.484)	(0.523)	(0.556)	(0.678)	(1.485)
Large Selectorate$_t$ $\times$ Δ Vote share$_t$	0.071	0.127	-0.052	-0.054	0.276	-0.595*
	(0.168)	(0.164)	(0.166)	(0.183)	(0.206)	(0.281)
Lose Power$_t$ $\times$ Large Selectorate$_t$ $\times$ Δ Vote share$_t$	-0.376	-0.247	-0.104	-0.621	-1.658*	-1.256
	(0.543)	(0.583)	(0.587)	(0.658)	(0.813)	(1.631)
Panel B: Interaction with Binary Indicator for Loss of Vote Share$_t$						
Loss of Power$_t$	3.713^{+}	1.503	6.099^{+}	5.829^{+}	6.672^{+}	-2.383
	(2.191)	(2.500)	(3.201)	(3.163)	(3.706)	(4.467)
Large Selectorate$_t$	-2.195	-2.984	0.165	2.922	-1.261	7.304*
	(2.092)	(2.669)	(2.082)	(4.276)	(6.977)	(2.939)
Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ Large Selectorate$_t$	-3.499	1.238	-7.700^{+}	-3.791	0.174	-1.073
	(3.396)	(3.938)	(4.172)	(4.328)	(5.182)	(5.599)
Loss of Votes$_t$	-1.386	-3.134*	-0.453	-1.728	-1.445	-1.506
	(1.523)	(1.257)	(1.928)	(1.185)	(1.405)	(1.697)
Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ Loss of Votes$_t$	10.184	12.663	8.299	12.194	23.656	7.826
	(12.283)	(12.717)	(11.259)	(11.588)	(16.541)	(5.988)
Large Selectorate$_t$ $\times$ Loss of Votes$_t$	1.596	4.844**	-0.660	1.886	4.790^{+}	-1.733
	(1.908)	(1.574)	(2.467)	(1.831)	(2.460)	(2.349)
Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ Large Selectorate$_t$ $\times$ Loss of Votes$_t$	-0.652	-8.497	0.473	-10.111	-43.195*	3.043
	(13.203)	(13.630)	(12.695)	(12.616)	(17.611)	(8.583)
Vote share$_t$	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Platform$_t$ FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Out of Coalition$_t$	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Country FE	yes		yes			
Party FE		yes		yes	yes	yes
Decade FE		yes				
Election FE			yes	yes	yes	yes
Sample					Two-Party	> Two Party
Observations	1115	1115	1115	1115	551	564

Standard errors are clustered by party.
$^{+}p < 0.10, ^{*}p < 0.05, ^{**}p < 0.005$

Table A19: Standard errors clustered at the party level. Countries are weighted by inverse of number of observations as in Table 3.

Table A10 replicates Table 4 Columns [1]-[5] from the main text while examining heterogeneity in Δ *Voteshare*$_{it}$. We observe that in both Panels A and B, that with a small selectorate, parties that lost power at time t appear to be electorally rewarded for subsequent shifts to the extreme, resulting in higher probabilities of returning to office in time $t+2$. This relationship does not appear to be moderated by Δ *Voteshare*$_{it}$ or its binned counterpart.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
			Government Party, $t+2$		
Panel A: Interaction with (Continuous) Δ Vote Share$_t$					
Loss of Power$_t$	-0.127^{+}	-0.099	-0.136	-0.184	-0.076
	(0.073)	(0.071)	(0.086)	(0.154)	(0.097)
To Extreme$_{t+1}$	-0.069	-0.062	-0.080	-0.167	-0.033
	(0.055)	(0.044)	(0.060)	(0.108)	(0.066)
Lose Power$_t$ $\times$ To Extreme$_{t+1}$	0.404^{+}	0.486*	0.541^{+}	0.169	0.687*
	(0.222)	(0.234)	(0.294)	(0.320)	(0.332)
Δ Vote share$_t$	-0.006	-0.000	-0.002	0.006	-0.007
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ Δ Vote share$_t$	0.010	0.010	0.014	0.018	-0.001
	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.013)
To Extreme$_{t+1}$ $\times$ Δ Vote Share$_t$	-0.014	-0.011	-0.008	0.009	-0.011
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.018)
Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ To Extreme$_{t+1}$ $\times$ Δ Vote share$_t$	0.010	0.022	0.010	-0.058	0.086
	(0.031)	(0.026)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.069)
Panel B: Interaction with Binary Indicator for Loss of Vote Share$_t$					
Loss of Power$_t$	-0.163*	-0.166*	-0.224**	-0.352**	-0.043
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.077)	(0.112)	(0.084)
To Extreme$_{t+1}$	-0.034	-0.037	-0.075	-0.082	-0.099
	(0.061)	(0.065)	(0.073)	(0.097)	(0.100)
Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ To Extreme$_{t+1}$	0.428^{+}	0.548*	0.626*	0.399	0.701*
	(0.232)	(0.235)	(0.293)	(0.349)	(0.351)
Loss of Votes$_t$	-0.025	0.017	0.018	0.023	0.008
	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.031)	(0.028)
Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ Loss of Votes$_t$	0.077	0.119	0.176	0.304	0.015
	(0.130)	(0.146)	(0.163)	(0.208)	(0.184)
To Extreme$_{t+1}$ $\times$ Loss of Votes$_t$	0.004	0.025	0.019	-0.007	0.057
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.061)
Loss of Power$_t$ $\times$ To Extreme$_{t+1}$ $\times$ Loss of Votes$_t$	-0.082	-0.060	-0.018	-0.151	0.109
	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.121)	(0.196)	(0.135)
Vote share$_t$	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Platform$_t$ FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Out of Coalition$_t$	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Party FE		yes	yes	yes	yes
Election FE	yes		yes	yes	yes
Sample				Two-Party	> Two Party
Observations	1886	1886	1886	813	1073

Standard errors are clustered by party.
$^{+}p < 0.10, ^{*}p < 0.05, ^{**}p < 0.005$

Table A20: Standard errors clustered at the party level. Countries are weighted by inverse of number of observations as in Table 4.

A11 Coverage of Data Set

The primary feature that conditions our sample is the availability of the CMP classification of platforms. We note, however, that for most results, we require three elections worth of platforms. To calculate the shift preceding an electoral event (loss of power) we require platforms the coding of platforms P_t and P_{t-1}. To look at electoral shifts subsequent to the electoral event, we require platforms P_{t+1} and P_t.

Denote party i's platforms P_t for $t \in \{1, ..., T\}$ where 1 indexes the first platform in the CMP dataset and T indexes the most recent platform in the CMP dataset. Our units of analysis consist of P_t for $t \in \{2, ..., T-1\}$. When there exist other limitations on the availability of data, the sequence of platforms includes the second until penultimate platforms given available data.

There are three specifications reported in the main text and appendix for which such there are substantially different subsamples. In particular, selectorate coding is only available since 1960, growth results have some missingness, and definitions of platforms based on a weighted average of three elections (see A6) limit the number of elections in the dataset. The authors will provide graphs of data coverage of the panel in a supplementary web appendix.

A12 Regression Tables Supporting Figures 1 and 2

Figures 1 and 2 present data on parties in government prior to election t. For these specifications, we cannot use our main specifications because we only observe one party per election. As such, we cannot employ election fixed effects.

	Center Platform$_{t+1}$			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Loss of Power$_t$	-0.136^{***}	-0.167^{***}	-0.150^{***}	-0.124^{**}
	(0.040)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.060)
Voteshare$_t$		yes	yes	yes
Out of Coalition$_t$	yes	yes	yes	yes
Platform$_t$ FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Country FE			yes	
Party FE				yes
Observations	383	382	382	382
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

Table A21: This table supports the results depicted in Figure 1 (center panel) on the subset of parties in power prior to election t. Standard errors are clustered by party.

	Government Party after election$_{t+1}$			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Loss of Power$_t$	-0.291^{***}	-0.245^{***}	-0.121^{*}	-0.028
	(0.055)	(0.068)	(0.062)	(0.062)
To Extreme$_{t+1}$	-0.310^{*}	-0.283^{*}	-0.322^{**}	-0.369^{**}
	(0.170)	(0.163)	(0.164)	(0.161)
Loss of power$_t \times$ To Extreme$_{t+1}$	0.598^{**}	0.561^{**}	0.580^{**}	0.691^{***}
	(0.254)	(0.245)	(0.235)	(0.247)
Voteshare_t		yes	yes	yes
Country FE			yes	
Party FE				yes
Observations	383	382	382	382
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

Table A22: This table supports the results depiected in Figure 2 (right panel) on the subset of parties in power prior to election t. Standard errors are clustered by party.

A13 Theoretical Model

A13.1 Proof of Proposition 1

There are two cases. First, consider the open process. For any party L opponent, this voter prefers a high-quality faction E candidate to a low-quality faction M candidate if:

$$\phi(p_L, b_L, y_R^E, b; y_m)(-|y_R^d - y_R^E| + b) + (1 - \phi(p_L, b_L, y_R^E, b; y_m))(-|y_R^d - p_L| + b_L) >$$
$$\phi(p_L, b_L, y_R^M, 0; y_m)(-|y_R^d - y_R^M|) + (1 - \phi(p_L, b_L, y_R^M, 0; y_m))(-|y_R^d - p_L| + b_L)$$

Since $|y_R^d - y_R^E| = |y_R^d - y_R^M| = \delta/2$, the party median is indifferent between factions on ideological grounds, and receives higher utility from the faction E candidate because of her higher quality. Since $b > \delta$, $\phi(p_L, b_L, y_R^E, b; y_m) > \phi(p_L, b_L, y_R^M, 0; y_m)$ and the faction E candidate also wins with higher probability than the faction M candidate. Thus the party median voter will choose a high-quality extremist.

Now suppose that the faction M candidate is of higher quality. Since $\phi(p_L, b_L, y_R^M, b; y_m) > \phi(p_L, b_L, y_R^E, 0; y_m)$, the party median must then choose any high-quality candidate. Finally, if no faction has a quality advantage, then the faction M candidate is clearly preferred because $\phi(p_L, b_L, y_R^M, 0; y_m) > \phi(p_L, b_L, y_R^M, 0; y_m)$.

In the second case, the process is closed. For any party L opponent, the faction E median voter prefers a low-quality faction E candidate to a high-quality faction M candidate if:

$$\phi(p_L, b_L, y_R^E, 0; y_m)(-|y_R^E - y_R^E| + w) + (1 - \phi(p_L, b_L, y_R^E, 0; y_m))(-|y_R^E - p_L| + b_L) >$$
$$\phi(p_L, b_L, y_R^M, b; y_m)(-|y_R^E - y_R^M| + b) + (1 - \phi(p_L, b_L, y_R^M, b; y_m))(-|y_R^E - p_L| + b_L).$$

Simplifying and rearranging produces:

$$\left(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{2y_m - y_R^E - p_L - b_L}{2\alpha}\right) w + \frac{\delta + b}{2\alpha}(-|y_R^E - p_L| + b_L) \quad >$$
$$\left(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{2y_m - y_R^M - p_L + b - b_L}{2\alpha}\right)(-\delta + b)$$

Substituting in values for b_L and p_L to produce a lower bound on the left-hand side and an upper bound on the right-hand side simplifies the expression to:

$$\left(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{2y_m - y_R^E - y_L^M - b}{2\alpha}\right) w - \frac{\delta + b}{2\alpha}(\Delta + 2\delta) > \left(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{2y_m - y_R^M - y_L^E + b}{2\alpha}\right)(-\delta + b).$$

Next, using the facts that $2y_m - y_R^E - y_L^M > -\Delta - \delta$, $2y_m - y_R^M - y_L^E < \Delta + \delta$, and simplifying produces:

$$w > \frac{(b + \delta)^2 + \alpha(b - \delta) + 2b\Delta}{\alpha - \Delta - \delta - b}$$

This is satisfied by assumption in expression (8). This derivation is obviously sufficient for showing that the faction E median voter prefers the faction E candidate when no candidate has a quality advantage.

Similarly, for any party L opponent, the faction M median voter prefers a low-quality faction M candidate to a high-quality faction E candidate if:

$$\phi(p_L, b_L, y_R^M, 0; y_m)(-|y_R^M - y_R^M| + w) + (1 - \phi(p_L, b_L, y_R^M, 0; y_m))(-|y_R^M - p_L| + b_L) >$$
$$\phi(p_L, b_L, y_R^E, b; y_m)(-|y_R^M - y_R^E| + b) + (1 - \phi(p_L, b_L, y_R^E, b; y_m))(-|y_R^M - p_L| + b_L).$$

Simplifying and rearranging produces:

$$\left(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{2y_m - y_R^M - p_L - b_L}{2\alpha}\right) w + \frac{b - \delta}{2\alpha}(-|y_R^M - p_L| + b_L) >$$
$$\left(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{2y_m - y_R^E - p_L + b - b_L}{2\alpha}\right)(b - \delta).$$

Substituting in values for b_L and p_L to produce a lower bound on the left-hand side and an upper bound on the right-hand side simplifies the expression to:

$$\left(\frac{1}{2}+\frac{2y_m-y_R^M-y_L^M-b}{2\alpha}\right)w-\frac{b-\delta}{2\alpha}(\Delta+\delta)>\left(\frac{1}{2}+\frac{2y_m-y_R^E-y_L^E+b}{2\alpha}\right)(b-\delta).$$

Next, using the facts that $2y_m-y_R^M-y_L^M>-\Delta$, $2y_m-y_R^E-y_L^E<\Delta$, and simplifying produces:

$$w>\frac{(\alpha+\Delta+2b-\delta)\,(b-\delta)}{\alpha-\Delta-b}$$

This is satisfied by assumption in expression (8). This derivation is obviously sufficient for showing that the faction M median voter prefers the faction M candidate when no candidate has a quality advantage.

The analysis for a factional median voter preferring her own candidate when she has a quality advantage is trivial and therefore omitted. ■

A13.2 Infinite Horizon Model

As with the finite-horizon model analyzed in the main text, the stage game equilibrium describes strategies in each period because candidates live for only a single period and voters are never pivotal. We again restrict attention to equilibria in which voters use Markovian strategies, playing exactly as they do in the stage game and ignoring payoff-irrelevant game history. The conditions of each period can thus change only through the identity of the parties' lead factions and the current incumbent party (i.e., the winner of the preceding period's election).

To capture these parameters, let the state of the game be the triple (i, f_L, f_R), where $i \in \{L, R\}$ is the incumbent party, and $f_L \in \{M, E\}$ and $f_R \in \{M, E\}$ are the lead factions of parties L and R, respectively. This state variable can take on eight values, and completely describes the parameters at each period. The states are connected by an 8×8 transition matrix $\mathbf{Q}$, where each element $Q_{s,s'}$ gives the probability of moving from any state s in period t to any another state s' in period $t+1$. Note that aside from identifying the incumbent and the lead factions, the probabilities are Markovian; i.e., independent of history.

While the full matrix $\mathbf{Q}$ would be quite cumbersome to write, the individual elements therein are straightforward to derive. Each $Q_{s,s'}$ is determined by three components. The first two components are the probabilities of factional choice within each party, which depend on π and λ, and the availability of a high quality candidate, which depends on ρ. The final component is the probability of victory of the election winner in s', which is derived from equation (8). For example, the following equation gives the probability that an R extremist defeats an L moderate, starting from a setting where R had previously won a contest between moderate factions.

$$Q_{(R,M,M),(R,M,E)}=\frac{\lambda\rho\pi((1-\rho\pi)(2y_m-2y_R^M+\alpha-\delta+\Delta)+b(1-\rho-\rho\pi))}{2\alpha} \tag{2}$$

The transition matrix allows us to analyze the equilibrium as a simple Markov chain. More specifically, it can be shown that the Markov process corresponding to the equilibrium has a unique stationary distribution. This implies that the distribution of states over time is independent of the initial state.[1] For each state s, let q_s be the long-run proportion of periods spent in s. Using conventional techniques, we may calculate each q_s and other quantities of interest. For example, the proportion of time spent under party R control is the sum of q_s's where s is of the form (R, f_L, f_R). In conjunction with $\mathbf{Q}$, we can use q_s to calculate the likelihood of particular short-run evolutionary paths.

The model allows us to numerically calculate several quantities of interest that correspond to the empirical quantities that we estimate. To describe these, we first define the following notation to describe relevant sets of states.

Define:

- $\mathcal{S}$ as the set of eight states of the form (i, f_L, f_R)
- $\mathcal{R} = \{(R,m,m),(R,e,m),(R,m,e),(R,e,e)\}$, as the states in which R is the incumbent

[1] Formally, since the number of states is finite and each is accessible from every other state in one step, the Markov chain is positive recurrent. This implies the existence of a stationary distribution.

- $\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{S} \setminus \mathcal{R}$, as the states in which L is the incumbent
- $\mathcal{F}_{Re} = \{(R,m,e),(R,e,e),(L,m,e),(L,e,e)\}$, as the set of states in which R's lead faction is extreme
- $\mathcal{F}_{Rm} = \{(R,m,m),(R,e,m),(L,m,m),(L,e,m)\}$, as the set of states in which R's lead faction is moderate
- $\mathcal{F}_{Le} = \{(R,e,m),(R,e,e),(L,e,m),(L,e,e)\}$, as the set of states in which L's lead faction is extreme
- $\mathcal{F}_{Lm} = \{(R,m,m),(R,m,e),(L,m,m),(L,m,e)\}$, as the set of states in which L's lead faction is extreme

We now derive the three quantities of interest. All quantities are expressed in terms of an R incumbent party. The calculation for the L party is symmetric.

Probability of Running on an Extreme Platform

Suppose R is the incumbent. The first quantity compares the party's probability of running on an extreme platform following loss of power vs. re-election.

After loss of power:

$$\sum_{s\in\mathcal{R}}\left(q_s\sum_{s'\in\mathcal{L}}Q_{s,s'}\left(\sum_{s''\in\mathcal{F}_{Re}}Q_{s',s''}\right)\right) \tag{3}$$

After re-election:

$$\sum_{s\in\mathcal{R}}\left(q_s\sum_{s'\in\mathcal{R}}Q_{s,s'}\left(\sum_{s''\in\mathcal{F}_{Re}}Q_{s',s''}\right)\right) \tag{4}$$

Probability of Reversal of Platform

Suppose R is the incumbent. The second quantity compares the party's probability of platform reversal following loss of power vs. re-election.

After loss of power:

$$\sum_{\substack{s\in\\ \{(R,m,m),\\ (R,e,m)\}}} q_s\Big(\sum_{\substack{s'\in\\ \{(L,m,e),\\ (L,e,e)\}}} Q_{s,s'}\Big(\sum_{s''\in\mathcal{F}_{Rm}}Q_{s',s''}\Big)\Big)+\sum_{\substack{s\in\\ \{(R,m,e),\\ (R,e,e)\}}} q_s\Big(\sum_{\substack{s'\in\\ \{(L,m,m),\\ (L,e,m)\}}} Q_{s,s'}\Big(\sum_{s''\in\mathcal{F}_{Re}}Q_{s',s''}\Big)\Big) \tag{5}$$

After reelection:

$$\sum_{\substack{s\in\\ \{(R,m,m),\\ (R,e,m)\}}} q_s\Big(\sum_{\substack{s'\in\\ \{(R,m,e),\\ (R,e,e)\}}} Q_{s,s'}\Big(\sum_{s''\in\mathcal{F}_{Rm}}Q_{s',s''}\Big)\Big)+\sum_{\substack{s\in\\ \{(R,m,e),\\ (R,e,e)\}}} q_s\Big(\sum_{\substack{s'\in\\ \{(R,m,m),\\ (R,e,m)\}}} Q_{s,s'}\Big(\sum_{s''\in\mathcal{F}_{Re}}Q_{s',s''}\Big)\Big) \tag{6}$$

Probability of Adjustment

Suppose R is the incumbent. We compare the party's probability of platform shift following loss of power vs. re-election.

After loss of power:

$$\sum_{s\in\mathcal{R}} q_s\Big(\sum_{\substack{s'\in\\ \{(L,m,e),\\ (L,e,e)\}}} Q_{s,s'}\Big(\sum_{s''\in\mathcal{F}_{Rm}}Q_{s',s''}\Big)\Big)+\sum_{s\in\mathcal{R}} q_s\Big(\sum_{\substack{s'\in\\ \{(L,m,m),\\ (L,e,m)\}}} Q_{s,s'}\Big(\sum_{s''\in\mathcal{F}_{Re}}Q_{s',s''}\Big)\Big) \tag{7}$$

After reelection:

$$\sum_{s\in\mathcal{R}} q_s\Big(\sum_{\substack{s'\in\\ \{(R,m,e),\\ (R,e,e)\}}} Q_{s,s'}\Big(\sum_{s''\in\mathcal{F}_{Rm}}Q_{s',s''}\Big)\Big)+\sum_{s\in\mathcal{R}} q_s\Big(\sum_{\substack{s'\in\\ \{(R,m,m),\\ (R,e,m)\}}} Q_{s,s'}\Big(\sum_{s''\in\mathcal{F}_{Re}}Q_{s',s''}\Big)\Big) \tag{8}$$

A13.3 Proofs of Remarks 1-3

Remarks 1-3 use the Markov chain from the infinite horizon model to consider three-period sequences that start from state (R, m, m). This is equivalent to starting the three-period game with R as incumbent and M as the lead faction in both parties. Note that because the $y_m = 0$ implies a balanced electorate, assuming R as the incumbent party is without loss of generality.

The following lemma presents a preliminary result on calculating transition probabilities in **Q**. For notational convenience, we present the result for transitions where party R wins re-election; transitions involving party L victories are defined analogously.

Lemma 1 Transition Probabilities. *The transition probability between states (R, f_L, f_R) and (R, f'_L, f'_R) is:*

$$Q_{(R,f_L,f_R),(R,f'_L,f'_R)} = \eta_{f_L,f'_L}(1)\eta_{f_R,f'_R}(\lambda)\phi(y_L^{i'}, \theta_{f_L,f'_L}(1)b, y_R^{j'}, \theta_{f_R,f'_R}(\lambda)b; y_m)$$

where $\eta_{f_i,f'_i}(\tilde{\lambda})$ is the probability of adjustment from faction f_i to faction f'_i within party i:

$$\eta_{m,m}(\tilde{\lambda}) = 1 - \tilde{\lambda}\pi\rho \tag{9}$$

$$\eta_{m,e}(\tilde{\lambda}) = \tilde{\lambda}\pi\rho \tag{10}$$

$$\eta_{e,m}(\tilde{\lambda}) = \tilde{\lambda}\pi(1-\rho) \tag{11}$$

$$\eta_{e,e}(\tilde{\lambda}) = 1 - \tilde{\lambda}\pi(1-\rho), \tag{12}$$

and $\theta_{f_i,f'_i}(\tilde{\lambda})$ is the probability of a factional quality $b_i = b$, conditional upon adjustment from faction f_i to faction f'_i within party i:

$$\theta_{m,m}(\tilde{\lambda}) = \frac{\rho}{1 - \tilde{\lambda}\pi\rho} \tag{13}$$

$$\theta_{m,e}(\tilde{\lambda}) = 1 \tag{14}$$

$$\theta_{e,m}(\tilde{\lambda}) = \frac{\rho}{1-\rho} \tag{15}$$

$$\theta_{e,e}(\tilde{\lambda}) = \frac{\rho}{1 - \tilde{\lambda}\pi(1-\rho)}, \tag{16}$$

and $\tilde{\lambda} \in \{\lambda, 1\}$ is the ease of party leadership transitions, which depends on whether the party wins or loses.

Proof. First observe that the probability of factional transition is independent of the result of an upcoming election. By Proposition 1, the party decisive voter always nominates the high quality candidate if one exists and she has the opportunity. The opportunity arises with probability $\tilde{\lambda}\pi$, where $\tilde{\lambda} = \lambda$ if the party won the preceding election and $\tilde{\lambda} = 1$ otherwise. Denote the probability of transition of lead faction from f_i to f'_i by $\eta_{f_i,f'_i}(\tilde{\lambda})$.

Thus starting from faction m as the lead faction, the lead faction becomes e with probability $\eta_{m,e}(\tilde{\lambda}) = \tilde{\lambda}\pi\rho$. The lead faction remains m otherwise. Similarly, starting from e as the lead faction, the lead faction becomes m with probability $\eta_{e,m}(\tilde{\lambda}) = \tilde{\lambda}\pi(1-\rho)$, since m is chosen whenever faction e does not have a high quality candidate. The lead faction remains e otherwise.

To calculate party R's probability of victory conditional upon the factional transitions f_L to f'_L and f_R to f'_R, we use expression (9) from the main text, which gives the probability of an R victory $\eta(\cdot)$. This expression is obviously linear in b_L and b_R, and therefore the desired probability is given by substituting in the expected values of b_L and b_R, conditional upon the factional transitions. To calculate $\theta_{e,e}(\tilde{\lambda})$, we use Bayes' rule to calculate $\Pr\{b_i = b \mid f_i = f'_i = e\}$:

$$\frac{\Pr\{f_i = f'_i = e \mid b_i = b\} \Pr\{b_i = b\}}{\Pr\{f_i = f'_i = e \mid b_i = b\} \Pr\{b_i = b\} + \Pr\{f_i = f'_i = e \mid b_{-i} = b\} \Pr\{b_{-i} = b\} + \Pr\{f_i = f'_i = e \mid b_i = b_{-i} = 0\} \Pr\{b_i = b_{-i} = 0\}}$$

$$= \frac{1 \cdot \rho}{1 \cdot \rho + (1 - \lambda\pi)\rho + (1 - \lambda\pi)(1 - 2\rho)}$$

$$= \frac{\rho}{1 - \lambda\pi(1-\rho)}.$$

This produces expression (16). The calculations for other values of $\theta_{f_i,f_i'}(\tilde{\lambda})$ are similar and therefore omitted. ■

We now state and prove the result.

Remark 1 Platform Extremity. *Let* $y_m = 0$. *If* $\delta > b - \frac{\lambda(1-2\rho)\pi(\alpha(1-\lambda)+b(1+\lambda)\rho)+\alpha(1-\lambda)}{(\lambda+1)\pi(\lambda\rho(2\rho\pi-\pi-1)+\lambda-\rho)}$, *then the probability that the incumbent party loses and then runs on an extreme platform is higher than the probability that it wins and then runs on an extreme platform.*

Proof. We calculate the difference in probabilities of observing each event for party R following wins and losses, conditional upon starting state $\sigma = (R, m, m)$. The result for party L is symmetrical and therefore omitted.

Simplifying expression (3) produces party R's probability of running on an extreme platform following loss of power:

$$\hat{Q}^{\mathcal{L}}_{ext} = \sum_{s' \in \mathcal{L}} Q_{(R,m,m),s'} \left(\sum_{s'' \in \mathcal{F}_{Re}} Q_{s',s''} \right)$$

Likewise, using (4), party R's probability of running on an extreme platform following re-election is:

$$\hat{Q}^{\mathcal{R}}_{ext} = \sum_{s' \in \mathcal{R}} Q_{(R,m,m),s'} \left(\sum_{s'' \in \mathcal{F}_{Re}} Q_{s',s''} \right)$$

Each expression requires the calculation of 20 transition probabilities. Using the result of Lemma 1 and performing the appropriate substitutions produces:

$$\hat{Q}^{\mathcal{L}}_{ext} = \frac{\lambda\rho\pi\left(\alpha(2-\lambda\pi) + b\left(\lambda\rho\pi^2 - 2(1-\lambda)\rho\pi - \lambda\pi - \rho + 1\right) + \delta\lambda\pi(1-\rho-\rho\pi) + 2\delta\rho\pi - \delta\right)}{2\alpha}$$
$$\hat{Q}^{\mathcal{R}}_{ext} = \frac{\rho\pi\left(\alpha(1+\lambda-\lambda\pi) + b\lambda\left(\rho(1-\pi-\pi^2) + \pi - 1\right) + b\rho\pi + \delta\lambda(\rho\pi^2 - \pi + 1) - \delta\rho\pi\right)}{2\alpha}.$$

The difference evaluates to:

$$\hat{Q}^{\mathcal{L}}_{ext} - \hat{Q}^{\mathcal{R}}_{ext} = \frac{\rho\pi\left[\alpha(1-\lambda)(1-\lambda\pi) + b\left(\lambda^2\pi(1-\rho(\pi+2)) - \lambda(2-\pi)(1-\rho-\rho\pi) + \rho\pi\right) - \delta\left((1-\lambda^2)\rho\pi - \lambda(2-\pi-\lambda\pi)(1-\rho\pi)\right)\right]}{2\alpha}$$

Solving for δ produces the following condition for this difference to be positive:

$$\delta > b - \frac{\lambda(1-2\rho)\pi(\alpha(1-\lambda)+b(1+\lambda)\rho)+\alpha(1-\lambda)}{(\lambda+1)\pi\left(\lambda\rho(2\rho\pi-\pi-1)+\lambda-\rho\right)}. \quad \blacksquare \tag{17}$$

Remark 2 Platform Reversal. *Let* $y_m = 0$. *If* $\delta > b - \frac{\alpha(1-\lambda)+b(1+\lambda)\rho}{(1+\lambda)(1-\rho\pi)}$, *then the probability that the incumbent party loses and then reverses its preceding platform shift is higher than the probability that it wins and then reverses its preceding platform shift.*

Proof. We calculate the difference in probabilities of observing each event for party R following wins and losses, conditional upon starting state $\sigma = (R, m, m)$. The result for party L is symmetrical and therefore omitted.

Simplifying expression (5) produces party R's probability of running on an extreme platform following loss of power:

$$\hat{Q}^{\mathcal{L}}_{rev} = \sum_{\substack{s' \in \\ \{(L,m,e), \\ (L,e,e)\}}} Q_{(R,m,m),s'} \left(\sum_{s'' \in \mathcal{F}_{Rm}} Q_{s',s''} \right)$$

Likewise, using (6), party R's probability of running on an extreme platform following re-election is:

$$\hat{Q}^{\mathcal{R}}_{rev} = \sum_{\substack{s' \in \\ \{(R,m,e), \\ (R,e,e)\}}} Q_{(R,m,m),s'} \left(\sum_{s'' \in \mathcal{F}_{Rm}} Q_{s',s''} \right)$$

Each expression requires the calculation of 10 transition probabilities. Using the result of Lemma 1 and performing the appropriate substitutions produces:

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{Q}^{\mathcal{L}}_{rev} &= \frac{\lambda(1-\rho)\rho\pi^2[\alpha + b(\rho(1+\pi)-1) + \delta(1-\rho\pi)]}{2\alpha} \\ \hat{Q}^{\mathcal{R}}_{rev} &= \frac{\lambda^2(1-\rho)\rho\pi^2[\alpha - b(\rho(1+\pi)-1) - \delta(1-\rho\pi)]}{2\alpha}. \end{aligned}$$

The difference evaluates to:

$$\hat{Q}^{\mathcal{L}}_{rev} - \hat{Q}^{\mathcal{R}}_{rev} = \frac{\lambda(1-\rho)\rho\pi^2\left[\alpha(1-\lambda) - b(1+\lambda)(1-\rho-\rho\pi) + \delta(1+\lambda)(1-\rho\pi)\right]}{2\alpha}$$

Solving for δ produces the following condition for this difference to be positive:

$$\delta > b - \frac{\alpha(1-\lambda) + b(1+\lambda)\rho}{(1+\lambda)(1-\rho\pi)}. \quad \blacksquare \tag{18}$$

Remark 3 Platform Adjustment. *Let $y_m = 0$. If $\delta > b - \frac{\alpha(1-\lambda)(\lambda(1-2\rho)\pi+1)+b\lambda(1+\lambda)\rho(1-2\rho)\pi}{(1+\lambda)\pi(2\lambda\rho^2\pi-\lambda\rho(1+\pi)+\lambda-\rho)}$, then the probability that the incumbent party loses and then adjusts its platform is higher than the probability that it wins and then adjusts its platform.*

Proof. We calculate the difference in probabilities of observing each event for party R following wins and losses, conditional upon starting state $\sigma = (R, m, m)$. The result for party L is symmetrical and therefore omitted.

Simplifying expression (7) produces party R's probability of running on an extreme platform following loss of power:

$$\hat{Q}^{\mathcal{L}}_{adj} = \sum_{\substack{s' \in \\ \{(L,m,e), \\ (L,e,e)\}}} Q_{(R,m,m),s'} \left(\sum_{s'' \in \mathcal{F}_{Rm}} Q_{s',s''} \right) + \sum_{\substack{s' \in \\ \{(L,m,m), \\ (L,e,m)\}}} Q_{(R,m,m),s'} \left(\sum_{s'' \in \mathcal{F}_{Re}} Q_{s',s''} \right)$$

Likewise, using (8), party R's probability of running on an extreme platform following re-election is:

$$\hat{Q}^{\mathcal{R}}_{adj} = \sum_{\substack{s' \in \\ \{(R,m,e), \\ (R,e,e)\}}} Q_{(R,m,m),s'} \left(\sum_{s'' \in \mathcal{F}_{Rm}} Q_{s',s''} \right) + \sum_{\substack{s' \in \\ \{(R,m,m), \\ (R,e,m)\}}} Q_{(R,m,m),s'} \left(\sum_{s'' \in \mathcal{F}_{Re}} Q_{s',s''} \right)$$

Each expression requires the calculation of 20 transition probabilities. Using the result of Lemma 1 and performing the appropriate substitutions produces:

$$\hat{Q}^{\mathcal{L}}_{adj} = \frac{\rho\pi\left[\alpha\lambda\pi(1-2\rho)+\alpha-\pi\left(b\left(2\lambda\rho^2(1+\pi)-\lambda\rho(2+\pi)+\lambda-\rho\right)+\delta\left(\rho-\lambda(1-\rho\pi-\rho+2\rho^2\pi)\right)\right)\right]}{2\alpha}$$
$$\hat{Q}^{\mathcal{R}}_{adj} = \frac{\lambda\rho\pi\left[\alpha\lambda\pi(1-2\rho)+\alpha+b\pi\left(2\lambda\rho^2(1+\pi)-\lambda\rho(2+\pi)+\lambda-\rho\right)+\delta\pi\left(\rho-\lambda(1-\rho\pi-\rho+2\rho^2\pi)\right)\right]}{2\alpha}.$$

The difference evaluates to:

$$\hat{Q}^{\mathcal{L}}_{adj} - \hat{Q}^{\mathcal{R}}_{adj} =$$
$$\frac{\rho\pi\left[\alpha(1-\lambda)(\lambda(1-2\rho)\pi+1)-(1+\lambda)\pi\left(b\left(2\lambda\rho^2(1+\pi)-\lambda\rho(2+\pi)+\lambda-\rho\right)+\delta\left(\rho-\lambda(1-\rho-\rho\pi+2\rho^2\pi)\right)\right)\right]}{2\alpha}.$$

Solving for δ produces the following condition for this difference to be positive:

$$\delta > b - \frac{\alpha(1-\lambda)(\lambda(1-2\rho)\pi+1)+b\lambda(1+\lambda)\rho(1-2\rho)\pi}{(1+\lambda)\pi\left(2\lambda\rho^2\pi-\lambda\rho(1+\pi)+\lambda-\rho\right)}. \quad \blacksquare \tag{19}$$

Supplementary Appendix: References

André, Audrey, Sam Depau, Matthew S Schugart, and Roman Chytilek. 2015. "Party nomination strategies in flexible-list systems: Do preference votes matter?" *Party Politics* 23 (5): 589–600.

Ariga, Kenichi. 2015. "Incumbency Disadvantage under Electoral Rules with Intraparty Competition: Evidence from Japan." *Journal of Politics* 77 (3): 874–887.

Benoit, Kenneth, and Michael Marsh. 2010. "Incumbent and Challenger Campaign Spending Effects in Proportional Electoral Systems." *Political Research Quarterly* 63 (1): 159–173.

Besley, Timothy, Olle Folke, Torsten Persson, and Johanna Rickne. 2017. "Gender Quotas and the Crisis of the Mediocre Man: Theory and Evidence from Sweden." *American Economic Review* 107 (8): 2204–2242.

Burden, Barry. 2009. "Candidate-Driven Ticket Splitting in the 2000 Japanese Elections." *Electoral Studies* 28 (1): 33–40.

Campbell, Rosie, Philip Cowley, Nick Vivyan, and Markus Wagner. 2016. "Legislator Dissent as a Valence Signal." *British Journal of Political Science* 49 (105-128).

Cancela, João, António Luís Dias, and Marco Lisi. 2017. "The impact of endorsements in intra-party elections: Evidence from open primaries in a new Portuguese party." *Politics* 37 (2): 167–183.

Cox, Gary W., and Michael F. Thies. 2000. "How Much does Money Matter? "Buying" Votes in Japan, 1967-1990." *Comparative Political Studies* 33 (1): 37–57.

Crisp, Brian F., Santiago Olivella, Michael Malecki, and Mindy Sher. 2013. "Vote-Earning Strategies in Flexible List Systems: Seats at the Price of Unity." *Electoral Studies* 32: 658–669.

Dal Bó, Ernesto, Frederico Finan, Olle Folke, Torsten Persson, and Johanna Rickne. 2017. "Who Becomes a Politician?" *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 132 (4): 1877–1914.

Esteve-Volart, Berta, and Manuel Bagues. 2012. "Are Women Pawns in the Political Game? Evidence from Elections to the Spanish Senate." *Journal of Public Economics* 96 (3-4): 387–399.

Ezrow, Lawrence, Catherine De Vries, Marco Steenbergen, and Erica Edwards. 2011. "Mean Voter Representation and Partisan Constituency Representation: Do Parties Respond to the Mean Voter Position or to their Supporters?" *Party Politics* 17 (3): 275–301.

Fiva, Jon H., and Danien M. Smith. 2017. "Local Candidates and Voter Mobilization: Evidence from Historical Two-Round Elections in Norway." *Electoral Studies* 45: 130–140.

Folke, Olle, Torsten Persson, and Johanna Rickne. 2016. "The Primary Effect: Preference Votes and Political Promotions." *American Political Science Review* 110 (3): 559–578.

Green, Donald P, and Jonathan S. Krasno. 1988. "Salvation for the Spendthrift Incumbent: Reestimating the Effects of Campaign Spending." *American Journal of Political Science* 32 (4): 884–907.

Hainmueller, Jens, and Holger Kern. 2008. "Incumbency as a Source of Spillover Effects in Mixed Electoral Systems: Evidence from a Regression-Discontinuity Design." *Electoral Studies* 27: 213–227.

Hirano, Shigeo, and James M. Snyder. 2019. *Primaries in the United States*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hobolt, Sara B., and Bjorn Hoyland. 2011. "Selection and Sanctioning in European Parliamentary Elections." *British Journal of Political Science* 41: 477–498.

Jacobson, Gary C. 1989. "Strategic Politicians and the Dynamics of U.S. House Elections, 1946-1986." *American Political Science Review* 83 (3): 773–793.

Kenig, Ofer, Gideon Rahat, and Reuven Y. Hazan. 2013. "Leadership Selection Versus Candidate Selection in Parliamentary Democracies: Similarities and Differences." Working Paper, available at `https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/d730a6f6-7e80-4f6f-a3df-a0590f645d79.pdf`. Accessed 1 July 2019.

Kjaer, Ulrik, and Mona Lena Krook. 2019. "The blame game: analyzing gender bias in Danish local elections." *Politics, Groups, and Identities* Online first: 1–12.

Knight, brian, and Nathan Schiff. 2010. "Momentum and Social Learning in Presidential Primaries." *Journal of Political Economy* 118 (6): 1110–1150.

Kotakorpi, Kaisa, and Panu Poutvaara. 2011. "Pay for Poiticians and Candidate Selection: An Empirical Analysis." *Journal of Public Economics* 95: 877–885.

Kovar, Jan, and Kamil Kovar. 2013. "Candidate Quality Across Different Orders of Elections: The Cases of the Czech Republic and Slovakia." *East European Politics* 29 (2): 152–174.

Laver, Michael, and W. Ben Hunt. 1992. *Policy and Party Competition*. London: Routledge.

Loewen, Peter John, Royce Koop, Jaime Settle, and James H. Fowler. 2013. "A Natural Experiment in Proposal Powe rand Electoral Success." *American Journal of Political Science* 58 (1): 189–196.

Lowe, Will, Kenneth Benoit, Slava Mikhaylov, and Michael Laver. 2011. "Scaling Policy Preferences from Coded Political Texts." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 36 (1): 123–155.

Maddens, Bart, Bram Wauters, Jo Noppe, and Stefaan Fiers. 2006. "Effects of Campaign Spending in an Open List PR System: The 2003 Legislative Elections in Flanders/Belgium." *Western European Politics* 29 (1): 161–168.

Mattes, Kyle, and Caitlin Milazzo. 2014. "Pretty faces, marginal races: Predicting election outcomes using trait assessments of British parliamentary candidates." *Electoral Studies* 34: 177–189.

McCurley, Carl, and Jeffery J Mondak. 1995. "Inspected by# 1184063113: The Influence of Incumbents' Competence and Integrity in US House Elections." *American Journal of Political Science* 39 (4): 864.

Milligan, Kevin, and Marie Rekkas. 2008. "Campaign Spending Limits, Incumbent Spending, and Election Outcomes." *Canadian Journal of Economics* 41 (4): 1351–1374.

Nyhuis, Dominic. 2016. "Electoral Effects of Candidate Valence." *Electoral Studies* 42: 33–41.

Nyhuis, Dominic. 2018. “Separating Candidate Valence and Proximity Voting: Determinants of Competitors’ Non-Policy Appeal.” *Political Science Research and Methods* 6 (1): 135–151.

Palda, Filip, and Kristian Palda. 1998. “The Impact of Campaign Expenditures on Political Competition in the French Legislative Elections of 1993.” *Public Choice* 94 (157-174).

Papp, Zsofia. 2017. “Candidate Features and Candidate Selection Patterns in Hungary, 1994–2010.” *International Journal of Sociology* 48: 76–93.

Pemstein, Daniel, Steven A. Meserve, and William T. Bernhard. 2015. “Brussels Bound: Policy Experience and Candidate Selection in European Elections.” *Comparative Political Studies* 48 (11): 1421–1453.

Reed, Steven R., Ethan Scheiner, and Michael F. Thies. 2012. “The End of LDP Dominance and the Rise of Party-Oriented Politics in Japan.” *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 38 (2): 353–376.

Roy, Jason, and Christopher Alcantara. 2015. “The Candidate Effect: Does the Local Candidate Matter?” *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* 25 (2): 195–214.

Schumacher, Gijs, Catherine E De Vries, and Barbara Vis. 2013. “Why Do Parties Change Position? Party Organization and Environmental Incentives.” *Journal of Politics* 75 (2): 464–477.

Sheafer, Tamir, and Shaul Tzionit. 2006. “Media-Political Skills, Candidate Seletion Methods and Electoral Success.” *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 12 (2): 179–197.

Silvester, J., and C. Dykes. 2010. “Selecting Political Candidates: A Longitudinal Study of Assessment Centre Performance and Political Success in the 2005 UK General Election.” *Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology* 80 (1): 2007.

Squire, Peverill. 1992. “Challenger Quality and Voting Behavior in US Senate Elections.” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 17 (2): 247–263.

Stone, Walter J, and Elizabeth N Simas. 2010. “Candidate valence and ideological positions in US House elections.” *American Journal of Political Science* 54 (2): 371–388.

Williams, Laron, and Katsunori Seki. 2016. “Seki-Williams Government and Ministers Data, Release 2.0.” Available at `https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/0UNUAM`. Accessed 1 July 2019.